By Alexander Garcia Duttmann
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Can one simply exclude certain thoughts and certain doubts without subordinating the excluded to that which excludes it and thereby, in principle, restricting and qualifying the trust of thought, its minimum or preliminary engagement? Can one simply do this, that is, without taking into account the conflict of non-identity? Surely bare trust cannot satisfy thought; the very concept of thought is indeed irreconcilable with bare trust. But whenever thought tries to restrict and qualify its own unalterable minimum or preliminary engagement because this engagement is a form of trust; whenever it seeks to justify trust within a division of labour or by ascribing it the tasks of acknowledgement and delimitation, it restricts trust in principle and raises itself surreptitiously above that which renders it possible.
Its own force lies in the negativity of dissolution, of the projecting dissolution and the dissolving projection. Hence every negation of enlightenment would simply contribute to enlightenment, pushing it further, beyond itself and thereby, strictly speaking, toward itself. The opening of enlightenment, by means of which it relates itself to something past and to something coming, stamps its relation to the present or its structurally modern aspect. In his well-known lecture from the early 1980s, Foucault characterizes this 'pure contemporaneity or actuality' with which the 'attitude' of the agent of enlightenment is concerned as the 'attitude de modernite\ as a way of thinking and feeling in connection with the present, or as being modern.
Truth is not subject to interrogation. The question concerning truth rests, however, in this very unquestionability, unavailability and incommensurability. If Dasein is not in command of truth because the latter resists reification, then its unavailability can be more precisely determined by pointing to the relation between the 'disclosure of beings' and the concealment of 'beings as a whole'. Untruth is not externally opposed to truth, but rather belongs to it essentially. This thought from Heidegger's lecture implies that inherent in every comportment to a being that disclosure renders possible, in every 'disclosure of a being' by Dasein lies an irresistible propensity to forget the Being of this disclosed being, of this being to be disclosed.