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April 5, 2017 | Legal Theory Systems | By admin | 0 Comments

By H. Patrick Glenn, Lionel D. Smith

This publication is exclusive in offering an interdisciplinary dialog among jurists and logicians. It brings jointly students from either legislation and philosophy and appears on the program of 'the new logics' to legislation and felony ordering, in a couple of criminal structures. the 1st half explores the ways that the hot logics make clear the functioning of felony orders, together with the constitution of felony argumentation and the foundations of facts. the second one addresses how non-classical logics may also help us to appreciate the interactions among a number of felony orders, in more than a few contexts together with family and overseas legislation. the ultimate half examines specific matters within the applicability of non-classical logics to criminal reasoning. This e-book might be of curiosity to jurisprudence and common sense students and scholars who are looking to deepen their figuring out of relationships among legislations and criminal reasoning, and know about fresh advancements in formal common sense.

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The strong way is to build an argument with the opposite conclusion, as we did above with argument D. Such a conclusion-toconclusion attack is called a rebutting attack. A rebutting counterargument may attack the final conclusion of its target but it may also attack an intermediate conclusion. 3 shows, argument D above attacks argument C by rebutting its intermediate conclusion that John’s mother consented. However, sometimes an argument can be attacked in a weaker way, namely, by saying that the premises, even if true, do not support their conclusion in the case at hand, because the case at hand is an exceptional case.

Argument C first uses a defeasible rule, namely, defeasible modus ponens, and then uses a strict rule, namely, standard modus ponens. So C can be attacked on its premises, on its conclusion that mother consented and on the application of defeasible modus ponens to derive that conclusion. Finally, argument D uses defeasible modus ponens and can therefore be attacked on its premises, its conclusion and its inference. • Argument B successfully undermines argument A, since B’s final conclusion contradicts a premise of A and since (as assumed above in Section 2) B is stronger than A with respect to this conflict since B provides a statutory exception to the legal rule that is A’s first premise (A’s third premise in fact assumes that there is no such exception).

S-defensible otherwise. 6 No further meaning should be attached to the terms ‘preferred’ and ‘grounded’. Also, the term ‘semantics’ is here used in a different way than in deductive logic, where it is used for the meaning of a formal language. 28 henry prakken In our example, if S is either grounded or preferred semantics, then all arguments are defensible: in grounded semantics since they all have no label and in preferred semantics since all four arguments are labelled in in one preferred labelling and out in another preferred labelling.

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