By Valerie Kerruish
In Jurisprudence as Ideology, Valerie Kerruish asks the way it is that individuals who're positioned down, permit down and stored down by way of legislation should be idea to have a common political legal responsibility to obey it. She engages with modern concerns in socialist, feminist and demanding felony idea, and hyperlinks those concerns to debates in jurisprudence and the philosophy and sociology of legislation.
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Extra resources for Jurisprudence as Ideology (Sociology of Law and Crime)
If the study of ideology is understood as the study of the relations between our ideas about social reality and social reality itself, its problem is that this is a relation whose form and content is concealed by negative forms of ideology. But there is a further question. All of this might be admitted in its reference to social reality, for it is indeed old hat that social reality is constructed, in part, by thought. But why bring in reality? Again, an answer to that question must begin with an admission that there is a difficulty with conceiving reality as that which is independent of, but knowable through, human consciousness.
Ostensibly this does not deny the significance of the relation. It merely asserts that we do not need to make reference to the use of coercive force to understand what law is. Sanctions are used to back up legal prohibitions and prescriptions. That is a fact and Hart does not deny it. But, he argues, we can understand an act as legally obligatory by reference to the intention of the law even if no sanction is attached to it. Sanctions are in fact attached because human nature is such that some people, some of the time will break the law.
Hart, Finnis and Dworkin all argue variants of them. Those who are aware of the negative ideology which has developed around science—the myth of value-free knowledge—and who see claims to know and understand merely as assertions of power, will dispute the claim that such claims can be made without reproducing that ideology. Realism must maintain its non-sceptical claim against these arguments through practice—including a practice of non-dogmatic argument which de-centres the model of adversarial argument in philosophy and legal theory (Bender 1988; Moulton 1983).