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3. 1_2007 30/5/07 1:37 Stránka 40 40 Information asymmetries, uncertainty and central bank communication “Most transparency models simply assume that information somehow gets perfectly conveyed. In fact, some models do not even have explicit announcements. ” (Geraats, (2006a), p. 144). In principle, improving the transparency of monetary policy means reducing information asymmetries between monetary policymakers and the private sector. However, there is still a lack of consensus on whether and to what extent increasing transparency is beneficial.
42 The general question is now: Does the existence of ‘behind-the-scenes’ political pressure justify some degree of central bank opacity? Various academics argue that “procedural opaqueness” (Issing, (1999, 2005a)), or “monetary mystique” (Geraats, (2006b)) could be efficient ways to prevent political pressures. Geraats presents a model in which transparency is only beneficial with central bank independence. e. the central bank is not completely independent in this regard, uncertainty about economic information then leads to restraint on the part of politicians concerning intervention by the government.
E. only exists on paper, as is still the case in many transitional countries, there is a danger that it will not only be ineffective but even counterproductive (Wagner, (1999)). 3 below. 42 The general question is now: Does the existence of ‘behind-the-scenes’ political pressure justify some degree of central bank opacity? Various academics argue that “procedural opaqueness” (Issing, (1999, 2005a)), or “monetary mystique” (Geraats, (2006b)) could be efficient ways to prevent political pressures.