By Christopher Lake
How should still items be dispensed in our society? a few say both, others say in keeping with what everyone is answerable for. either principles look believable yet neither inform the complete tale. the writer examines what attracts us to those rules and appears at fresh makes an attempt by means of egalitarian thinkers to convey them jointly in one distributive perfect.
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Additional resources for Equality and Responsibility
If claiming of X that he is responsible for b in some sense concludes the issue of how X ought to be treated in respect of b, then we will start thinking that any moral claims we want to advance in respect of X and b must be couched in terms of X's responsibility for b. And the temptation will then be to redescribe our claims about X and b in the language of responsibility and thereby to use ascriptions of responsibility as a polemical device. Return to the example of me, you, and your request for a handout.
Indeed, in the ﬁeld of rectiﬁcatory justice, our concern in deciding whether to act is with the conjunction of harm and responsibility. Neither of these two facts is to be understood in terms of the other and both seem to carry independent weight in our deliberations. All of which suggests that the question of whether I ought to receive a beneﬁt by virtue of being responsible for it is distinct from the general question of whether I ought to receive a beneﬁt, and distinct again from the speciﬁc question of whether I ought to receive a beneﬁt by virtue of com plying with the relevant background rules of justice.
This is because satisfying expensive tastes for which one is responsible would be no less demanding of the resources of others than satisfying expensive tastes for which one is not responsible: the subsidy called for is the same in each case. If, however, it is not the diverting of resources per se that is of concern—if, that is, there would be no objection in principle to subsidizing my taste for ﬁne wine and sports cars—then the argument would seem to be motivated by a claim about the respect we owe one another.