By David E. Lindsey
A narrative heritage by means of a Fed insider of the way financial coverage is formed within the US, with exact emphasis at the performances of former Chairman Ben Bernanke and present Chairwoman Janet Yellen in dealing with the prelude, outbreak, and aftermath of the 2008 monetary crisis.
Read or Download A Century of Monetary Policy at the Fed: Ben Bernanke, Janet Yellen, and the Financial Crisis of 2008 PDF
Similar money & monetary policy books
How and for whose profit the ecu vital financial institution (ECB) will paintings is among the most crucial matters dealing with Europe, and has been the topic of sizeable media and educational curiosity. a lot of this dialogue has been of an more and more emotional and political nature and has served to blur instead of tell.
Gold and the top-quality: the tale of Gold funds, earlier, current, and destiny is Edwin Walter Kemmerer's significant treatise. one of many twentieth century's unsung heroes, Kemmerer was once an economics professor at Princeton and was once a sought-after "money physician" within the interwar interval, assisting international locations determine and hold powerful currencies among 1923 and 1933.
Why do banks cave in? Are monetary platforms extra fragile in fresh many years? Can guidelines to mend the banking method do extra damage than stable? what is the heritage of banking crises? With dozens of short, non-technical articles through economists and different researchers, Banking Crises bargains solutions from diversified scholarly viewpoints.
- International Dimensions of Monetary Policy (National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report)
- Money and the global economy
- Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions, Strategies, and Instruments
- The Value of a Dollar: Prices and Incomes in the United States, 1860-2009
Extra resources for A Century of Monetary Policy at the Fed: Ben Bernanke, Janet Yellen, and the Financial Crisis of 2008
Assume that the initial collapse in economic activity largely was the delayed result of the earlier increases in Treasury bill rates on spending rather than because of other monetary factors and that the drop in the nominal money stock was mostly induced by the fall in nominal income. Despite these presumed facts—in fact, precisely because of them—the Federal Reserve still should be faulted for not reacting to the decline in the money stock. To be sure, the Fed should not have withdrawn reserves in order to raise Treasury bill rates so much in the two-year run-up to October 1929.
Hetzel wrote: The stock market boom in the last half of the 1920s prompted the next instance of purposeful deflation after 1919–1920. In the 1920s, gold inflows rather than advances from the discount window became the primary source of Federal Reserve credit. 6 Strong’s worsening illness followed by his death in October 1928 contributed to the leadership vacuum, and policy continued to drift. To make matters even worse, a conflict over how to deal with ever-rising equity prices flared up in 1928–1929 between the Reserve banks, especially New York, and the Board.
32 But their dialogue never became personal, since both Patman and Martin always remained cordial. Patman did deeply resent the activities of Reserve bank directors in lobbying to defeat his proposed legislation. For example, he blamed such pressure for subverting his efforts to have the government own the Fed, or impose Congressional appropriations to deprive the Fed of its independent source of funding, or have the Fed audited by the General Accounting Office (now Government Accountability Office) (GAO).